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God granted us the serenity to accept things we cannot change, courage to change 
things we can, and wisdom to know the diff erence.
[Reinhold Niebuhr]
A common knowledge shapes our perception of the world and forms our under-
standing of political phenomena. And almost everyone could agree with the argu-
ment that circumstances infl uence politics. ! e ebbs and fl ows in infl uence, power, 
prerogatives, performance, and activity of many political actors are an eff ect of 
changes in the world outside of them. But one may reasonably argue: what is the 
cause and what is the result? Is it really true the circumstances evidently, clearly 
have an eff ect on e.g. US presidential prerogatives? Or, quite contrary, is the actual, 
current politics as active as the presidents used their power? ! e article is about 
how the two worlds infl uence each other, what are the mutual connections between 
politics and political actors’ powers.
! e subject presented in the title of this paper seems to touch upon issues that 
are interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, the above-mentioned sphere of 
interest has a very well specifi ed, practical reference to reality. Military interventions 
(interventions undertaken by the United States in particular) have been attracting 
a lot of public attention and arousing emotions.¹ Secondly, the examples selected 
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¹ ! is is one of the elements that diff erentiate such forms of state activity from treaty policy or 
nominations, which traditionally have not been regarded as relatively highly confrontational spheres.
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are supported by access to comparatively well-documented sources. In this case – 
contrary to researching the issues of political leadership – we have, in principle, 
two opposite, clear possibilities: either the intervention took place or it did not. As 
a consequence of such a dichotomy such situations have to be included in the 
analysis. ! erefore, it must be pointed out that covert operations have not been 
included in the research.² ! irdly, military interventions create a form of political 
activity that is being constantly updated, verifi ed almost every day by the news 
from diff erent parts of the world. Also, considering the extensive bibliography 
accessible, various analyses and interpretations of the problem being examined 
would seem to form an interesting intellectual challenge. It is necessary to look 
critically at the work of other researchers and to assume a standpoint with regard 
to the proposals made above.
METHODOLOGICAL/THEORETICAL NOTE
Without going into too an over-detailed analysis of the American presidency, 
several basic issues are well worth taking into consideration. A number of diff erent 
examining perspectives are possible. ! e method involving an empirical approach 
seems to be the most promising.³ ! is is indispensable to solving the problem under 
consideration.
As regards examining techniques, observation and a subsequent description 
were most frequently used. ! is is mainly for practical reasons; the data obtained 
may be presented to the reader in the most accessible form. Statistical data was also 
used in the research.⁴ ! e inclusion of the latter complemented and illustrated the 
facts presented by means of observation and description.
! e last of the techniques used – the case study – does not completely cover all 
the features of monographic research. Considering the general features of the case 
² A covert operation is understood in accordance with the 10/2 NSC directive, dated 18th June, 
1948 as an activity sponsored by the United States government against foreign states or groups that is 
so planned and executed that U.S. responsibility for it is not evident to the authorized person and that, 
if uncovered, the government can plausibly deny responsibility for the action, from: DeConde, Burns 
and Logevall (2002: 387). ! e legal justifi cation of this type of activity is very laconic: under the 
National Security Act of 1947, the CIA may perform such other functions and duties related to intel-
ligence aff ecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct, 
from: ibid.: 391.
³ ! is means using the following techniques: the case study (monographic research), typical so-
ciological techniques and quantitative and statistical analysis.
⁴ More detailed, see: Edwards III (1981).
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study one should, however, keep in mind that there are serious limitations involved. 
! e description and explanation of the rules governing one phenomenon, although 
capable of providing information on its status and dynamics, can nonetheless be 
regarded as insuffi  cient in drawing conclusions of a more universal character. ! e 
use, within one analysis, of a series of cases and only then, on this enlarged basis, 
attempting to defi ne relationships between them, may off er a solution to this mat-
ter. ! e controversy over the doctrinal use of the case study is enough for many to 
merit an approach from a distance. ! is is why the examples of political activity 
chosen by the author are assuredly not classic examples of monographic research, 
but only – for better or worse – a considered choice of certain fragments of 
political reality. One can speculate that this selection provides a series of data that 
is necessary for drawing logical conclusions and for manifesting certain regularity. 
! erefore, the above procedure fulfi ls the requirements of “combined” research – 
involving both the diagnosis of the particular elements of reality and the possibil-
ity to verify certain hypotheses of a more general nature. ! is process of 
combination is made on the basis of data obtained from the fragment of political 
reality examined (military interventions).⁵
! erefore, from the point of view of this analysis, the use of an empirical method 
seems to be the most appropriate. Within this method, most important are the 
research techniques, directed towards observation, and the analysis of normative 
acts as well as other written documents, developing data obtained from examining 
a series of examples originating from the period analyzed and techniques aimed 
at obtaining quantitative and statistical data. ! e empirical value is to be obtained 
based on conclusions and generalizations gained from observation, and then by 
attempting to interpret the material gathered.
Accepting such a procedure consequently involves determining whether the 
selected examples are relevant for the examined subject and, if so, why.⁶
Let us now proceed to determine what has formed the subject of the research 
and why. ! e necessity for such a determination results from the need to narrow 
the fi eld of analysis to cases that can provide data from which conclusions from 
previously-made assumptions can be drawn. Such a step is indispensable in exam-
ining any sphere of political activity, including foreign policy.⁷
As indicated in the title, the subject of interest involves selected American mili-
tary interventions. ! e basis of the analysis is the list compiled by the Foreign 
Aff airs, Defense and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, of the Library 
⁵ Further reading on methodology in: Pika (1981/82). As regards using the case study in examin-
ing the presidency, more detailed in Edwards III and Wayne (1997: 483 and following).
⁶ Compare with Barilleaux (1988: 4).
⁷ See in Light (1993: 174) and Rohde (1994: 105).
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of Congress.⁸ " e list includes the cases of US military interventions abroad 
between 1798 and 1999. " e list only includes those actions that were taken in a 
situation of military confl ict, or its probability. Consequently, the list does not 
include: actions connected with responsibilities of a military character resulting 
from activities within the UN or other multilateral organizations, covert operations, 
disaster relief, or routine alliance stationing and training exercises. " e list includes 
interventions until 17th May 1999.
As regards the time span included in the research (1958–2003), it is determined 
by the global period of American foreign policy (the years a# er World War II). " e 
fi rst intervention complying with those determining factors denoted below marked 
the initial moment (1958). By analogy – the year 2003 closes the analysis, as it is 
when the last of the interventions took place – subject to appropriate measurements 
of a formal character and included in this study.
Apparently, reliance upon the Congressional Research Service list may raise 
justifi ed doubts, especially if other, competitive compilations are to be considered.⁹ 
However, it seems that the study used is the most comprehensible and – what is 
equally important – well-founded. Moreover, thanks to the formal measurements 
used, cases with a relatively low level of controversy have been avoided (assistance 
in disaster relief, peace-keeping operations within the UN) as well as cases which 
are dubious due to the way they were conducted (covert actions).
Summing up, the analysis is limited to cases of US military interventions abroad 
a# er 1958. Moreover, in connection with the fact that according to the Constitution 
and the statutory provisions (mainly War Powers Resolution, WPR) the war powers 
belong to the sphere of mutual competence of the President and Congress – only 
those interventions were included when the Capitol:
1.  was informed on the steps taken,
2.  reacted to such steps by applying the appropriate legally binding regulations 
as opposed to those of a merely informative character,
3.  stated its position in a way other than just the fi nancial regulations, which 
means including all other forms of giving consent to the use of military force, 
or a denial to grant consent, which in practice means passing appropriate 
resolutions.¹⁰
 ⁸ Grimmett (1999). 
 ⁹ See: Bickel (1991: 214-215). 
¹⁰ See: the Court of Appeal ruling in the Mitchell v. Laird case (488 F.2nd 611,1973). " e Court 
complied with the stand that the congressional consent to start military operations does not have to 
involve a formal declaration of war (this is a discretionary matter for congress to decide in which form, 
if any, it will give its consent). " e above-stated conditions very much refl ect the provisions laid down 
in WPR (PL 93-148). In this Resolution it has been stated that the president – as a Commander-in-
Chief of the US Army – can send the American troops to battlefi eld, but only if:
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  e substantial reduction of the selected interventions followed the latter meas-
ure. Fairly o" en, de facto and de iure, the only binding reaction of Congress to 
executive activity was the passing of appropriation acts. With this, such important 
interventions – from a political point of view – as those in Korea (1950–53),¹¹ 
Cambodia (1970–75), Honduras (1986) or Panama (1989) are not included in the 
analysis.
  e second of the categories excludes situations in which the Capitol “received 
information” from the White House, but at the same time limited its activity only 
to such a stage. Within this category the interventions resulting from the evacuation 
from Cambodia and Vietnam (1975), the Mayagües incident (May 1975) or the 
action to free the hostages held in the US Embassy in Teheran (April 1980) were 
excluded.
Also, the fairly numerous cases when Congress was never informed on the steps 
taken by the executive or was informed only a" er a delay exceeding the statutory 
stipulated limit (War Powers Resolution), were not included.¹²
Such a research perspective seems to evade certain methodological and theo-
retical problems.  e fi rst were mentioned earlier, the second category may be 
represented here by the disagreement concerning the defi nition of so-called “lim-
ited wars” and “full-scale wars.”  e doctrine teaches that the fi rst category includes 
cases when the Capitol has not approved presidential decisions. Apart from the 
doubts involved in such a standpoint,¹³ its adoption would make it impossible to 
trace activities that had not been granted the clearly positive opinion of the legisla-
tive power.
1. the declaration of war has been passed,
2. the appropriate Resolution has been passed,
3. there has been a threat to the security of the US territory or the US Armed Forces.
¹¹   e consent for the regular fi nancing of the war in Korea was accompanied by accusations 
from senators and congressmen directed at president H. Truman for the usurpation of power and 
the infringement of the constitution, see: DeConde, Burns and Logevall (2002: 333–334). For a more 
detailed discussion of the discrepancies between the executive and legislative powers with regard to 
the Korean War see: ibidem: 515 –516.
¹² e.g. Cyprus (July 1974), Korea (August 1976), Zaire (May 1978), Iran (June 1984), the Persian 
Gulf (1987), or Sierra Leone (May 1992).
¹³ See for instance: Osgood (1979).
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS.
A series of questions and hypotheses follow the above-stated sphere of interest. 
! e main research problem concerns the issue referred to in the title, that is the 
powers of the President of the United States in foreign policy and military interven-
tions (the independent variable, the basis of the research). ! rough the analysis of 
selected cases, it will be possible to answer the question as to whether the results 
of the research in any way support the theory concerning the change in the execu-
tion of presidential prerogatives over the years and the changing circumstances. 
! is will make it possible to answer a number of additional questions:
Firstly, what is the signifi cance of the number of actions taking place in the 
Capitol, which relate to the appropriate powers of the executive?
Secondly, is the party-affi  liation factor important – i.e. is it important (and why) 
whether the President is a Republican or a Democrat?
! irdly, is it true that Congress traditionally is more isolationistic than the 
executive is?
Also, is it important for the implementation of policy that it results from the fact 
that public opinion was informed and/or the legislative power was consulted? 
Another issue: was a change in the balance of power on an international arena of 
any importance? And in particular, is the process dynamic, with regard to the end 
of the Cold War?¹⁴
As it was mentioned earlier, the Constitution gives the appropriate power also 
to the legislature, so the answer to these questions may only be provided through 
an analysis of congressional reactions to attempts to use US armed forces by the 
President. ! e next logical step is to determine the factors that condition a particu-
lar standpoint adopted by the legislature (dependent variable – the results of specifi c 
conditions), and in particular:
 1.  What were the results of the vote in Congress?
 2.  In what way is the support, or the lack thereof, connected with the political 
shape of Congress and the White House?
 3.  Did the initiative to set forth appropriate legislation originate from the 
President or Congress, and the latter being the case, was it the action taken 
by the majority party or the opposition?
 4.  Were any consultations held with members of Congress?
 5.  Was public opinion informed about the events?
 6.  Was the action initiated as a result of US obligations under peace treaty 
stipulations or its functional substitute (a UN resolution)?
¹⁴ General comments on this subject can be found in: ! omas and Pika (1997: 136) and Am-
brose (1991/92: 136 –137).
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 7.  Did passing of the joint resolution sanction the operation?
 8.  Was the intervention led in conjunction with allied forces?
 9.  Were there American victims before the introduction of US armed forces?
10.  What position did the legislature take (approval/disapproval)?
Selected data, in accordance with the indicated set of criteria, form a basis to 
carry out the research process. ! e data is then subject to examination to determine 
whether or not there is a relationship with regard to the facts determined by the 
use of the dependent variables. As a consequence, we receive a systematic collection 
of data, which, if related to the questions asked, will bring the research process to 
a close. 
! e conclusions resulting from the study of other propositions should point to 
the following facts:
! e President of the US should have been expected to enjoy a much greater 
freedom in the period prior to the passing of the War Powers Resolution (1973). 
Later, in turn, we should observe the curtailment of this independence, a process 
accompanied by enlarged congressional activity.
Moreover, it seems that the consensus of opinion of the President and Congress 
should increase in situations: (1) constituting a threat to the lives of American 
citizens abroad; (2) initiating intervention in the region of the Western Hemisphere; 
(3) executing responsibilities laid down in defense treaties; (4) involving the exist-
ence of a parliamentary majority from the same political party as the President 
himself.
DATA PRESENTATION
Of all of the 110 items (from 1945 till 17th May 1999) included in the list of the 
Congressional Research Service, only the thirteen cases presented below were 
selected.
 1. Lebanon (1958),
 2. Cuba (1962),
 3. ! ailand and Laos (1962),
 4. Vietnam (1964–1973),
 5. Dominican Republic (1965),
 6. Sinai (1982),
 7. Lebanon (1982),
 8. Grenada (1983),






! e remaining of the military actions were rejected, as they do not fulfi l the 
criteria mentioned earlier. On the other hand, two more interventions were added 
to the above list: operations conducted in Afghanistan (2001) and the war in Iraq 
(2003).
Exceptional cases are the Formosa Resolution (1955)¹⁵ as well as the Berlin 
Resolution (1962).¹⁶ Although two of the cases fulfi l the established criteria, they 
were omitted from this analysis. ! is was because no movement of additional US 
armed forces accompanied these decisions, since they were present in those regions 
of the world already. In other words, only those cases were taken into consideration 
which comply with the scheme: military intervention – congressional action (or 
vice versa) and are not restricted exclusively to one of the above elements (see the 
table below).¹⁷ 
¹⁵ Despite the threat of developing confl ict (direct participation of the Chinese troops), the 
senators passed the appropriate act, with an overwhelming majority of votes 85:3, on the 25th of 
January (H.J. Res.159), known as the Formosa Straits Resolution. President D. Eisenhower was at the 
same time placed in a very favorable situation: he had not only the support of the legislature, but he 
was also allowed free choice of means and the scope of its use.
¹⁶ In October 1962 Congress unanimously passed the Berlin Resolution, under which it was re-
solved to prevent all Soviet-caused infringements of American, British, and French interests in 
Berlin. Being “an idealist without illusions” (Sorensen, 1970: 397), president J. Kennedy applied for 
legislature support as regards his fi rm policy towards the Soviet Union. From the formal point of 
view, the Berlin Resolution (H.Con. Rep. 570) that was passed on the 5th of October in the House of 
Representatives and fi ve days later in the Senate is worth giving attention to for two reasons. First, it 
was an eff ect of the initiative of Congress itself and, secondly, this was not a joint resolution of both 
chambers, but only a concurrent resolution, and therefore its importance was comparatively low and 
did not compel the executive to observe its provisions.
¹⁷ ! e resolutions concerning Formosa and Berlin should be seen as complying only with the 
requirements of congressional activity. 
Table 1. Systematization of the cases presented in the analysis.
military intervention  
congressional action
congressional action  
military intervention
 ailand and Laos (1962) Lebanon (1958)
Vietnam (1964–1973) Cuba (1962)
Dominican Republic (1965) Sinai (1982)
Lebanon (1982) Afghanistan (2001)
Grenada (1983) Iraq (2003)
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As stated earlier, the selection of data for the analysis may raise doubts. However, 
it seems that with regard to the necessity of narrowing the subject of the research to 
a particular fragment of political activity, it is a matter for arbitrary, discretionary, 
subjective, decision. It was possible, though, to use a fairly wide perspective, indicated 
by almost all the post-WW II presidents, diff erent party affi  liations, diff erent political 
situations in the US and in the world and the diff erent character and signifi cance of 
the interventions. # e arguments adduced may form a subject of discussion.
However, it has to be pointed out that omitting certain interventions from the 
analysis (the Korean War, for instance) is also an act with a certain meaning. Namely, 
it turns out that widely spread military operations and increased diplomatic activity 
do not necessarily comply with the formal and legal side of the issue. It is not in all 
instances that the important events have had the appropriate authorization by law 
(in this case the proper authorization to send American troops into battle).
Before proceeding with the data analyses, two important issues should be men-
tioned: the resolutions and US membership in the United Nations.
As regards resolutions, they are treated as one of the forms of congressional 
assent to the executive to resume certain activities. When passed, the Capitol 
expresses an opinion on a certain issue; it constitutes a sort of incentive for the 
executive in playing an active role in a particular area of political activity. It has to 
be mentioned that simple and concurrent resolutions constitute a legal remedy, 
allowing Congress to express its political, non-legal will, and thus in the US legal 
and political system they do not constitute a binding law – they do not require the 
president’s signature. But the joint resolutions of both chambers entail a require-
ment that the executive follow their provisions. Regardless of the type, the resolu-
tions may be passed on the initiative of the congressmen themselves, or the 
initiative may belong, indirectly, to the executive power.¹⁸
As regards the question of US membership in the UN, it was regulated in the 
United States Participation Act of 1945 (PL 79-264). Section 6 of this act stipulates 
¹⁸ # e fi rst case occurred in 1919, when the Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. # e second 
case took place on the occasion of concluding agreements on the localisation of the UN, establishing 
UNRRA, IMF, FAO, WHO, or UNESCO. More detailed: Briggs (1991: 23) and Hammond (1992: 61).
military intervention  
congressional action
congressional action  
military intervention






the conditions for the participation of US armed forces in military action outside 
the territory of the United States. In the event that there is a necessity to lead action 
aimed at “maintaining international peace and security” the president may send an 
appropriate military force.¹⁹ Such actions have, however, been conditioned by the 
need for the president to consult the UN Security Council on the number and 
character of the troops used, the destination of the troops, and details about the 
equipment and weapons to be deployed.
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
# e basis for the data analysis and interpretation constitute the data presented 
in Table 2. Its analysis allows for the observation of a number of regularities.
Firstly, the allegation that Congress is more isolationist in comparison with the 
executive seems dubious.²⁰ Until the passing of the War Powers Resolution, the 
Capitol has always manifested more initiative than the White House. Military actions 
have been sanctioned prior to sending troops (the action in the Dominican Repub-
lic being an exception). Later, this was much more infrequent – the intervention in 
the Sinai Peninsula in 1982 and actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, one 
has to remember that actions have almost always been taken with the consent of 
congressmen and/or public opinion. As regards the initiation of legislative activity, 
we face a situation in which the legislature has more frequently come up with pro-
jects to pass the appropriate regulations (11 cases out of 15 considered).
Secondly, the political party affi  liation issue is more complicated than it at fi rst 
may appear. Although, as a rule, senators and congressmen from the same political 
parties as the presidents almost always vote in accordance with the expectations 
of the executive,²¹ the behavior of the opposition does not fulfi l the rule of auto-
matically taking a position against it.²² We can talk about a “hard opposition” in 
reference to the voting on Lebanon (1982), the Persian Gulf (1991), Somalia (1993), 
Bosnia (1995), Haiti (1994), and Iraq (2002).
# irdly, the end of the Cold War and the changes involved with this process seem 
not to have infl uenced mutual relations between the two centers of power located 
¹⁹ United States Statues at Large. (1945: 621).
²⁰ See: Ambrose (1991/92: 136).
²¹ # e only exception being the voting in the House of Representatives on the Bosnia and Koso-
vo military actions, when the Democrats voted against the proposition presented by President 
W. J. Clinton.
²² # e most vivid example is the unanimous support granted by the opposition when the Senate 
voted on the intervention in Grenada.
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at Pennsylvania Avenue. ! e international situation has naturally infl uenced the 
debates in Congress, but the stability of certain solutions and procedures has not 
been much aff ected by the fact that there have been substantial changes in the 
international arena.
Also, it can be noted that the success of an action taken in Congress is independ-
ent of whether or not it had been informed earlier (or whether the public was 
informed) about the actions taken. We observe the following solutions:
–  not informing Congress and yet attaining unquestionable legislative success 
(Cuba),
–  not informing the public yet attaining success in Congress (Sinai),
–  informing both Congress and the public and attaining success (the majority 
of the cases considered),
–  informing both Congress and the public and failing (Bosnia).
As it can be seen, the rule: informing = success does not apply. 
Also, the executive holding consultations is not a typical solution. ! is was so 
only in seven of the cases considered – both prior to and a# er the passing of the 
War Powers Resolution. 
In all the cases considered, the legislative activity of Congress has de facto 
accepted the obligations assumed by the president. Only the level of this acceptance 
has varied: from almost a blind belief in the actions taken (e.g. initially Vietnam) 
to setting very rigorous requirements concerning the use of American troops 
(Lebanon’82, Grenada, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo). ! is case is touched upon in 
more detail in the fi nal conclusions.
Furthermore, it turns out to be the rule that actions have been taken on the basis 
of existing legal regulations. Such is the role – apart from the already-mentioned 
resolutions – of the international commitments of the United States, or UN resolu-
tions. Only in two instances (Grenada and Kosovo) the actions took place in a 
situation when there were not suffi  cient legal bases.
It seems that the decisions of Congress have not been infl uenced by the existence 
of co-operation between American armed forces and military units from allied 
countries. On only three occasions (Lebanon’58, Cuba, Dominican Republic) has 
the US acted independently, which, considering the provisions set forth in the 
appropriate resolutions – have not entailed any hostile attitude of the Capitol.
! e ideology and party affi  liation factor has proven to be unimportant – the fact 
whether a president is a Republican or a Democrat is not generally in any way 
signifi cant with regard to the implementation of particular commitments.
! ere is also no clear relation between victims being US citizens and the position 
adopted by Congress. Irrespective of whether or not there have been American 
victims in a particular country, the extent of congressional support and the pace 





























































































































































YES ( ailand) 
NO (Laos)
YES YES YES YES President (+)
Vietnam (1964–1973) D as above as above YES YES YES YES YES YES President (+)
Dominican Republic (1965) D —
R – 117:3
D – 195:49




Sinai (1982) R voice vote
R – 160:9
D – 208:4






































































































































































Somalia  (1992–1995) D —
R – 3:170
D – 239:9

















































 * In the case of the initiative taken by the Capitol, (+) and (-) apply respectively to the actions which have been initiated by the legislators from the 
same political party as the President, or from the opposition.
** As actions of a restrictive character (set out in bold characters), those regulations were selected which involved detailed specifi cation of the limita-
tions concerning the number of US soldiers and/or the length of their stay in a particular region of the world. Consequently – as the selective criteria – the 
requirement to supply the Capitol with special reports was not called for.
S – Senate; HR – House of Representatives; D – Democrat; R – Republican
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CONCLUSIONS AND EXPLANATION
  e analysis of the selected cases enables us to answer the question whether the 
results of the research can justify the hypothesis over time and in newly created 
circumstances in the realization of US presidential power.  e cases presented in 
the analysis fall within the following two categories:
(1)  e category defi ned by congressionally restrictive activity (Lebanon’82, 
Grenada, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo) and non-restrictive activity (as in other 
interventions).
(2) It can clearly be noticed that within the fi rst category fall interventions about 
which Congress was consulted (Bosnia being an example). On the other hand, 
however, the above requirement (consultation) is not a condition sine qua non for 
obtaining congressional acceptance.
In turn, in all fi ve of the cases in which Congress acted restrictively, a president 
had initiated the action without prior statutory authorization.  is could justify 
the thesis that Congress has a fairly unfavorable attitude towards over-active poli-
tics by the executive branch.  e fact that the Capitol came up with an initiative to 
regulate the assumed actions later may be a confi rmation of this.
As was previously mentioned, the party affi  liation factor does not determine the 
adoption of a particular solution. A vote limiting actions can be reached both 
through the voice of the opposition (Grenada) and the ruling party (Lebanon’82). 
Moreover, this process is characteristic of both chambers.
  e conducted analysis allows the following conclusions to be made:
1.  One cannot unambiguously observe a change in the realization of presiden-
tial powers and thus the actual role of restrictive congressional activity (e.g. 
War Powers Resolution) is limited.
2.  Changes in the balance of power in the international arena are not the fun-
damental determinants of congressional standing as regards the actions taken 
by the President.
3.   ere is no distinct connection between the approval of the Capitol and: the 
threat to the lives of American citizens abroad, initiation of interventions in 
the Western Hemisphere, realization of treaty commitments or the existence 
of a congressional majority from the same party as the president.
4.   ere are certain determinants that infl uence an unfavorable congressional 
attitude.
Ad 1.   e “vertical” analysis of Table 2 clearly shows that the time category is 
accompanied by the diff erentiated values “YES/NO” and “President/Congress.” Such 
diff erentiation is not unambiguously or clearly connected with the division into 
the periods before and a$ er the passing of the War Powers Resolution. Naturally, it 
is not the author’s intention to draw – as it seems too far-reaching – any conclusions 
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that the WPR provisions are unimportant. However, its importance is constantly 
verifi ed by both the practice of political life and judicial review. But Congress, for 
many years, has not been capable of realizing the provisions stipulated in a number 
of acts based on the War Powers Resolution. Another issue which requires thorough 
study is the issue as to whether the legislature has (and if it does, what are they?) 
any eff ective means to persuade the executive power to adopt appropriate behav-
ior.²³ $ e legislation – as potentially the most eff ective tool – seems, however, to be 
a factor of insuffi  cient infl uence. $ e reason for this is because the legislative 
process takes time (not to mention the political will which is necessary to endorse 
a certain opinion), and actions connected with foreign policy, especially those 
involving military forces, o& en require immediate decisions to be made. $ is 
“legislative imperfection” also results from the fact that not all the possible situations 
within foreign policy may (or even need to) be regulated in this way.
Ad 2. As has been shown above, over the years we have had various solutions 
regarding the execution of possible scenarios of action in the international arena. 
Despite the fact that for many years the US has been acting in concert with its allies, 
this by no means results in Congress automatically accepting the action taken. 
Moreover, the analysis shows that the end of the Cold War has not substantially 
infl uenced the subject of this research. $ e main means to achieving particular goals 
is still a relatively stable system of allies and bilateral agreements. $ anks to this 
eff ective scheme it was possible for the US to pass smoothly from the international 
conditions of the Cold War (mainly determined by competing with the communist 
countries) to the diff erent conditions of the present power-balance and the threats 
involved.²⁴ $ e reason for the above-outlined phenomena can be found in the fact 
that the American decisive mechanism in foreign policy, despite its dynamics, is still 
fairly “tight,” or resistant to the infl uence of lobbies. What is more, the external 
policy of the state is a long-term policy, prepared comprehensively and involving a 
series of issues. $ e practical scope of the realized policy (i.e. its eff ectiveness) seems 
to confi rm such a diagnosis, especially in crisis situations such as the operations 
a& er the 11th of September, 2001 (interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq).
²³ At this point it is worth mentioning that the post-WW II history of relations between the White 
House and the Capitol shows that, even in the issue of the consecutive fi scal acts, it is possible to have, 
naturally to a limited extent, a certain freedom in spending an approved sum. Foreign policy and the 
external security policy are spheres in which the temptation to treat allocated funds “elastically” are 
probably the strongest.
²⁴ Let us set aside investigations into whether the US is still a world superpower, or merely has 
a certain domination caused by the disappearance of the main Cold War enemy – the Communist 
Block. It has to be noted that, in general, assessment of a notion such as “power” is a relative issue – 
see: Ossowski (1983: 253).
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Ad 3. ! e outcome of legislative activity is always dependent on a series of 
unique and specifi c factors – no rigid rules apply to the model of procedures; the 
solutions adopted are always related to the actual circumstances. ! ese processes 
may be explained by the particular dynamics of the American political system. As 
with constitutional provisions, the issues discussed above are characterized (usually 
within the limits defi ned by the decisions of the Supreme Court) by a certain 
elasticity. Particular decisions, adopted solutions, and the implemented policy 
depend on unique determinants. ! ere is no simple scheme, no automation of 
action which would operate according to the following: no treaty grounds, actions 
outside the Western Hemisphere, the majority of Congress being from a party other 
than that of the president means the restrictive attitude of Congress and attempts 
to limit the action taken. ! is changeability, temporality, and elasticity of activities 
cannot be treated as a synonym of instability or freely taken actions. As in the 
quoted example of the Supreme Court ruling, here we also have limits determining 
the freedom of action. ! e action taken always fi ts within a defi ned area that is 
determined by the provisions of law and constitutional practice. In other words, if 
we do not fi nd ourselves within the sphere defi ned by the letter of the Constitution 
we at least fi nd ourselves within a sphere defi ned by its spirit.
Ad 4. On the basis of the analysis, it can be anticipated that the biggest chance 
for an unfavorable congressional reaction will be in respect of those actions which 
were: 
(a)  not consulted with congressmen and/or senators, 
(b)  conducted under the exclusive prerogatives of the executive, 
(c)  not preceded by the passing of appropriate resolutions, and 
(d)  those (but only based on data from the period a" er the passing of the 
WPR) which will be implemented independently by the US without 
the assistance of allied forces.
Considering the data gathered, it can be noted that Congress usually specifi es 
only the limiting date for American armed forces staying abroad and conditions 
about informing the legislature on the development of actions. Such decisions are 
in turn supported by the appropriate provisions in the appropriation acts.
It is generally assumed that Congress became more active in the sphere of foreign 
policy at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, and this activity 
allegedly took place because of the diminishing of the executive.²⁵ But the con-
ducted analysis does not support the thesis that the events during these years 
²⁵ ! e center of gravity shi" ed to the examination of the results of this activity; see: Lindsay and 
Steger (1993: 112). However, apart from the veracity of concepts so far presented, the attempt to 
answer the question on the genesis of particular activities and the reasons behind the adopted solu-
tions seems to be more important.
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constituted any important turning point for the above issue. Even if it were the case, 
it seems – as time goes by – that facts from thirty years ago should be approached 
circumspectly.  e passing of the War Powers Resolution and the series of subse-
quent, related regulations have not noticeably infl uenced the researched sphere of 
political activity except in the short-term perspective or limited as to the subject.²⁶ 
 us, rules of behavior that would assume a more general regularity have not been 
developed.  e fi ve cases of the restrictive attitude of the Capitol cannot be con-
sidered as such since the circumstances accompanying those events and the relevant 
debates and voting diff er considerably. 
Also, the concept of the alleged relation between congressional approval of the 
initiated action and the threat to the lives of Americans or action taking place in 
the region of Pax Americana has not been supported by research.
However, the thesis about some obscure connection between the party affi  liation 
in the White House and Congress, developed as a determinant of a mutual relationship 
between the two branches of government in the sphere of foreign policy, has been 
positively verifi ed. To be more specifi c: even if it is possible to trace the symptoms of 
such a phenomenon, the systematic determination of its character becomes an open 
question.  e President and the congressional majority being from the same political 
party and the reverse situation both have resulted in approving solutions.  erefore, 
the simple relationship: Congress and President from the same political party = success 
in voting on foreign policy, is not possible.  is is shown in the chart below. 
²⁶ As goes for the WPR – primarily with regard to the informing policy.
²⁷ See reasons for the passive and amicable character of the legislature in: Fisher (1999: 258).
Chart 1. Presidential success in voting on foreign policy (in percentage):
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  e experiences of the last fi  "y years seem to point out that the mutual relation-
ship in foreign policy between Congress and President is a choice between an 
eff ective model (dynamic, active executive) and an ostensible one (co-operation of 
both branches).
Moreover, as the analysis demonstrates, consecutive presidents may enjoy a fairly 
wide freedom in the external policy-making process.  is is certainly not the result 
of the strictly legal, exact understanding of the prerogatives stipulated in the Con-
stitution.  e American Constitution – especially in the issues concerned – locates 
executive power and legislature within a “checks and balances” system. It is a truism 
to declare that the power of the president is only the result of the provisions laid 
down in the Constitution. Accepting such a view, one could point out a lot more 
clauses which allow Congress to win such “constitutional bidding.”
  e actual advantage of a president is “natural,” immanent – and results from 
the existence of specialized bureaucratic machinery, the possibility to make fairly 
quick decisions, access to specifi c information, and acting within a favorable envi-
ronment to utilize such attributes. One cannot forget Congress itself. It has no 
possibility or, even more importantly, the will to limit the president’s freedom of 
action.²⁷ It seems that since the passing of the War Powers Resolution the Capitol 
has watched the executive more closely. But the period of (non-)adhering to the 
provisions of the above resolution also has instances of a more favorable attitude 
for the challenges taken by successive presidents in the international arena. Regard-
less of the adduced reasons for the phenomena discussed, it must be underlined 
that foreign policy falls within the responsibilities of the executive power, which, 
however, realizes its power with the co-operation of the legislature. Such was the 
intention of the creators of the American Constitution, and practice positively 
perpetuates these over two-hundred-year-old guidelines.
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